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RESUMO
A continuidade no comportamento entre espécies tem sido amplamente assumida na análise do
comportamento, embora pesquisas recentes pareçam desafiar uma versão forte do pressuposto da continuidade.
Este artigo apresenta uma revisão de fontes potenciais para a descontinuidade humano-não humano em escolha e
auto-controle.  Ênfase especial é colocada nas diferenças nos procedimentos empregados para estudar humanos e
outros animais, que dificultam comparações entre espécies.  Modificações nos procedimentos empregados com
não-humanos (por meio do uso de sistemas de reforço do tipo fichas) e com humanos (por meio do emprego de
sistemas de reforço do tipo consumatório) mostram maior acordo nos padrões de escolha de humanos e outros
animais. Isto sugere que pelo menos algumas das diferenças relatadas sobre escolhas em procedimentos de auto-
controle em humanos  e outros animais refletem diferenças de procedimento, mais do que diferenças mais
fundamentais em processos comportamentais. Ao estreitar as lacunas metodológicas que separam procedimentos
empregados com humanos e não humanos, esta pesquisa aponta estratégias mais efetivas para avaliar a continuidade
no comportamento entre espécies.
Palavras-chave: escolha, autocontrole, reforçamento por fichas, reforço consumatório, continuidade entre espécies.
ABSTRACT
Cross-species continuity in behavior is widely assumed in behavior analysis, and yet some recent research
appears to challenge a strong version of the continuity assumption.  This paper reviews potential sources of
human-nonhuman discontinuity in the area of choice and self-control.  Special emphasis is given to differences in
the procedures used to study humans and other animals, which hinder cross-species comparisons.  Modifying the
procedures used with nonhumans (through the use of token-type reinforcement systems) and with humans
(through the use of consumable-type reinforcement systems) brings the choice patterns of humans and other
animals into better accord.  This suggests that at least some of the reported differences in self-control choices in
humans and other animals reflect procedural differences rather than more fundamental differences in behavioral
process.  By narrowing the methodological chasm separating human and nonhuman procedures, this research
points to more effective strategies for assessing cross-species continuity in behavior.
Key words: choice, self-control, token reinforcement, consumable reinforcement, species continuity.
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CHOICE AND SELF-CONTROL
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What does it mean to be human?  Do
humans have special qualities that
distinguish them from other animals?  What,
if anything, do humans share with other
animals?  Such questions about the place of
humans in nature extend far back in recorded
history.  According to the Bible, humans have
dominion over other animals:
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And God said, Let us make mankind in our
image, after our likeness, so they may rule over
the fish of the sea, and the birds of the air, over
the cattle, and over all the earth, and over all the
creatures that move on the earth.
Genesis 1:26
This theme—of humans remaining
separate from and superior to other animals—
remained a central part of philosophy for many
centuries.  Descartes saw the fundamental
difference as one involving the rational soul:
...there is nothing that leads weak minds further
astray from the path of virtue than to imagine
that the souls of animals are of the same nature
as ours, and that, after this life, we have nothing
to fear, and nothing to hope, any more than flies
and ants. (Descartes, 1637/1960, p. 82)
This view remained dominant, in science
as well as in the culture at large, until Darwin’s
time.  In a notebook written some 20 years
prior to the publication of  On the Origin of
Species, Darwin wrote:
Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work
worthy the interposition of a deity.  More
humble and I think truer to consider him created
from animals.  (cited in Rachels, 1990, p. 1)
Darwin’s ideas were predicated on the
notion of species continuity—of general
principles that were applicable to all species,
including humans.  This idea of species
continuity radically overturned the
conventional wisdom that humans were
separate from the rest of nature, occupying some
privileged position on a ladder of progress.
After Darwin, it became more difficult
(at least within scientific circles) to regard
humans as distinct from animals on the grounds
that humans possessed a soul, but it remained
possible to hold to the facts of evolution and
yet retain the idea that humans are
fundamentally different than other animals;
that is, to acknowledge some continuity
between species but to retain the belief in a
“ladder of progress” or “Great Chain of
Being”—an ordered sequence of steps that
leads progressively and inevitably to humans.
According to this view, human beings possess
special qualities—if not a “soul,” as Descar-
tes had suggested, then something else, e.g.,
mind, consciousness or rationality—that
forever keeps humans distinct from other
animals.  (Incidentally, this was the view
adopted by Spencer, a contemporary of
Darwin who formulated an independent
theory of natural selection.)
To counteract such an anthropocentric view,
Darwin and his followers adopted a viewpoint
that was equally extreme in the opposite
direction—a kind of naive anthropomorphism,
which, among other things, attributed complex
reasoning skills to worms:
If worms have the power of acquiring some
notion, however rude, of the shape of an object
and of their burrows, as seems to be the case,
they deserve to be called intelligent; for they
then act in nearly the same manner as would a
man under similar circumstances.  (Darwin,
1881/1985, p. 97)
Statements such as this were based more
on anecdotes than on systematic observations
or experiments, and as such were equally
beyond the facts of the time.  But Darwin’s
approach carried with it the important
implication that we should use the same
standards in evaluating human and nonhuman
intelligence, a practice that was taken up in
earnest by comparative psychologists in the
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early part of this century (Wasserman, 1981).
Today we no longer need to rely on
anecdotal evidence or whimsical tales.  Based
on decades of comparative research, we now
have a wealth of systematic data on the relative
capabilities of a wide range of animals on a
variety of tasks.  On the whole, such evidence
reveals impressive generalities across species.
The concept of reinforcement, for example,
has broad applicability across the animal
kingdom.  This kind of cross-species generality
helps to justify the practice of using
“representative” animals to study behavioral
laws presumed to operate for other species,
including humans (Harrison, 1994;
Wasserman, 1994).  It also helps justify the
extension of procedures and findings from the
animal laboratory to real-life human affairs
(Branch & Hackenberg, 1998).
Some research, however, has also revealed
some apparent differences between humans and
other animals.  A growing body of evidence
gathered over the past few decades appears to
challenge a strict version of the species
continuity idea by showing, for instance, that
humans behave differently than other animals
exposed to analogous conditions.
What accounts for such differences
between humans and other animals?  Are
differences best regarded as qualitative
(difference in kind) or quantitative (difference
in degree)?  Do such differences undermine
the cross-species continuity of behavioral laws?
Are special principles needed to account for
human behavior?
These are important questions.
Unfortunately, clear answers to such questions
are hampered by procedural differences.
Humans and other animals are studied with
different procedures, and it is quite possible
that at least some of the reported species
differences in performance are a product of
these procedural differences.  Until such
methodological problems are resolved, it is not
possible to determine whether, or to what
extent, genuine species differences exist.
In the present paper, I review research
bearing on this problem, using some recent
studies in the area of self-control and choice to
illustrate an analytic strategy for minimizing
procedural differences that have hampered past
attempts at species comparisons.  I will place
special emphasis on differences in the
reinforcement procedures typically used with
humans and other animals and on whether
these procedures can be brought into better
alignment in ways that yield more balanced
species comparisons.  I will then consider some
general implications of this research for cross-
species continuity of behavioral processes.
SPECIES DIFFERENCES IN CHOICE AND SELF-
CONTROL
In laboratory studies of self-control,
subjects are given repeated choices between a
smaller more immediate reinforcer and a larger
delayed reinforcer (Ainslie, 1974; Mischel,
1966; Rachlin & Green, 1972).  Selecting the
smaller reinforcer is said to reflect sensitivity
to reinforcer immediacy (“impulsivity”)
whereas selecting the larger reinforcer is said
to reflect sensitivity to reinforcer magnitude
(“self-control”).  Nonhuman animals (mostly
pigeons) tend to prefer the smaller sooner
reinforcer.  There are exceptions—as when both
outcomes are sufficiently delayed by adding a
constant prereinforcer delay to each alternative
(Green, Fisher, Perlow, & Sherman, 1981;
Rachlin & Green, 1972), or as when an
extensive fading history is established (Mazur
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& Logue, 1978)—but as a general rule
nonhumans show clear delay sensitivity.  Adult
humans, on the other hand, tend to exhibit
considerably less delay sensitivity than
nonhuman animals on such procedures (see
Logue, 1988, for a review).  Across a range of
different conditions, humans tend to behave
in ways that maximize the overall density of
reinforcement.  As Logue, Pena-Correal,
Rodriguez, and Kabela (1986) put it:
…adult humans, unlike pigeons, are sensitive
to events as integrated over whole sessions and
tend to maximize total reinforcement over whole
sessions (p. 172).
Several interpretations have been
proposed to account for such species differences
in self-control, most of which appeal to
qualitative human-specific adaptations such as
verbally governed behavior (e.g., Horne &
Lowe, 1993).  By this view, laboratory tasks
generate verbal behavior that interacts with and
determines the nonverbal choice patterns.
Others view the differences in more
quantitative terms, by treating them as arising
from different rates of temporal discounting
(Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994).  As plausible
as these interpretations may be, they cannot
be adequately evaluated until critical differences
in the procedures used to study choice in
humans and other animals are reconciled.
A key procedural difference separating
human from nonhuman studies of self-control
concerns the nature of the reinforcement
system.  In studies with nonhuman subjects,
reinforcers are typically unconditioned
reinforcers such as food, which is consumed
soon after it is presented.  In studies with adult
human subjects, on the other hand, reinforcers
typically consist of conditioned reinforcers such
as points exchangeable for money some time
after the experimental session.  Because points
cannot be exchanged or consumed
immediately, and because delays to the periods
during which they can be exchanged typically
are held constant (normally at the end of the
session or at the end of the experiment), there
is no particular advantage to obtaining points
quickly.  Indeed, equalizing delays to both
reinforcers gives a special advantage to
reinforcer amount, which with these procedures
strongly favors selecting the large-reinforcer
option.
TOKEN REINFORCEMENT SYSTEMS
It may be useful to conceptualize the
typical experimental arrangement used with
human subjects (where points earned at Time
A are exchanged for reinforcers at Time B) as a
kind of token reinforcement system
(Hackenberg & Vaidya, 2003; Hyten, Field,
& Madden, 1994; Jackson & Hackenberg,
1996).  Token reinforcers are usually physically
manipulable objects (such as coins, poker chips,
or marbles), but they can be defined more
generally as conditioned reinforcers “that the
organism may accumulate and later exchange
for other reinforcers” (Catania, 1998).  This
more general definition would include events
like points exchangeable for money, as well as
other nonmanipulable tokens (e.g.,
checkmarks, stickers etc.).
By this view, a token reinforcement
system is a kind of extended chain schedule in
relation to which a coordinated pattern of
behavior develops.  A token reinforcement
schedule consists of a series of three interrelated
component schedules: (a) the token-production
schedule, the schedule by which a response
produces delivery of tokens; (b) the token-
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exchange schedule, the schedule by which
exchange opportunities are made available; and
(c) the terminal-reinforcer schedule, the schedule
by which tokens produce the terminal
reinforcer.  In laboratory research with humans,
self-control and impulsivity are typically
defined in relation to the first schedule—the
delays to token delivery and number of tokens
earned (points).  Previous research on token
reinforcement procedures, however, indicates
that (a) the token-production schedule is less
critical than either (b) or (c)—the schedules
governing how and when tokens are exchanged
for other reinforcers (Foster, Hackenberg, &
Vaidya, 2001; Webbe & Malagodi, 1978).
The pervasiveness of self-control reported
in studies with humans and the species
differences in self-control may both be
derivatives of holding constant the delays to
the exchange periods during which the points
are exchangeable for the terminal (monetary)
reinforcers.  Such contingencies virtually
guarantee insensitivity to token delays, and yet
self-control is typically defined with respect to
these token delays.  In a sense, the findings
with humans do not represent self-control at
all—at least not with respect to the critical
reinforcers in the terminal link of the chain
(money).  Instead, they merely indicate
sensitivity to amount of monetary
reinforcement with delays to monetary
reinforcement held constant.  In this sense, the
results are perfectly consistent with the results
of experiments with pigeons showing
preference for larger over smaller food amounts
with equal delays (Grace, 1995; Logue,
Rodriguez, Peña-Correal, & Mauro, 1984;
Snyderman, 1983).
This has important implications for cross-
species analysis of choice.  If differences in
performance stem in part from differences in
the reinforcement systems used with humans
and other animals, then bringing procedures
into better alignment should also bring the
cross-species choice patterns into better
alignment.  There are two main ways this can
be accomplished.  First, the procedures used
with nonhumans can be made more “human-
like” through the use of token reinforcement
systems modeled after the types of systems
normally used with humans.  Second, the
procedures used with humans can be made
more “animal-like” through the use of
consumable-type reinforcers more like those
normally used in research with nonhumans.
These will be discussed in turn.
MAKING ANIMAL PROCEDURES MORE “HUMAN-
LIKE”: TOKEN-TYPE REINFORCERS WITH PIGEONS
To better approximate procedures
typically used with humans, Jackson and
Hackenberg (1996) studied pigeons’ choices
in a self-control arrangement with token-like
reinforcers.  Instead of points, tokens consisted
of small stimulus lights mounted in a hori-
zontal array above the response keys in an
otherwise standard conditioning chamber; and
instead of money, the terminal reinforcers
consisted of food.  Choices on the side keys
illuminated either 1 token (small reinforcer)
or 3 tokens (large reinforcer).  When lit, each
token was “worth” 2-s of food in that it was
exchangeable for 2-s of food during scheduled
exchange periods (signaled by a red center key).
The exchange period remained in effect
until all earned tokens had been exchanged for
food.   A variable-duration intertrial interval
(ITI) separated successive trials so that choices
were temporally spaced evenly, 60 s apart.  Two
forced-choice trials at the outset of each session,
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designed to bring behavior into contact with
the consequences arranged for each alternative,
were followed by ten choice trials.  Initially,
an exchange period was scheduled each trial.
The ratio of choice trials to exchange periods
was increased systematically across conditions,
eventually reaching a ratio of 10:1 (one
exchange following a 10-trial session).  This
condition was seen as most closely analogous
to a typical session with human subjects, in
which tokens (points) accumulate across trials
for a post-session exchange.
In the first condition of Experiment 2,
the delays to tokens and the delays to the
exchange period were equal for both options,
and an exchange period occurred every trial;
that is, token presentation was immediate and
exchange periods were scheduled 1.5 s from
either choice.  All 6 pigeons showed strong
(nearly exclusive) preference for the large
reinforcer under these conditions.  That choices
show characteristic sensitivity to reinforcer
amount with reinforcer delays held constant is
important in functionally calibrating these
procedures against more conventional
procedures.  In subsequent self-control
conditions, the delays to tokens differed for
the two options: choosing the small-reinforcer
(1 token) option produced the token
immediately, whereas choosing the large-
reinforcer (3 token) option produced 3 tokens
after a 6-s delay.  In most of these conditions,
the delays to the exchange period were equal
following either choice, as they typically are
in studies with human subjects and point/
money reinforcers.
Four of the 6 pigeons consistently
preferred the larger reinforcer (i.e., showed self-
control) under these conditions.  This
tentatively supports the view presented above,
namely, that studying pigeons under
conditions more characteristic of human
research gives rise to performance that is more
characteristically human.  Still, a few questions
remained unanswered.  To begin with, 2 of the
6 subjects failed to show self-control.  Second,
2 of the 4 who did show self-control were
sometimes insensitive to the exchange-delay
manipulation (i.e., they sometimes preferred
the large reinforcer even on trials when the
small-reinforcer option produced quicker access
to the exchange period).  Perhaps as a result of
a long history of selecting the larger reinforcer
with equal delays, a general preference for that
alternative developed even under conditions
when it was delayed (Mazur & Logue, 1978).
To test this notion, and to evaluate the
effects of the exchange-delay manipulation in
a more direct fashion, Jackson and Hackenberg
(Experiment 4) ran an additional sequence of
conditions similar to, but much simpler than,
some conditions of the prior experiment.  The
critical manipulation involved the delay to the
exchange period.  In some conditions, termed
Equal Exchange Delay, the delay to the exchange
period was equal for either choice, as in the
final conditions from the earlier experiment.
In other conditions, termed Unequal Exchange
Delay, exchange periods occurred directly
following token presentation, and were thus
shorter after small-reinforcer choices (owing to
the shorter token delays) than after large-
reinforcer choices.  Thus, in the former but
not the latter conditions exchange periods and
food were differentially correlated with choice
patterns.  If the critical delays are those between
choices and exchange periods/food and not
between choices and tokens (as self-control has
conventionally been defined), then one would
predict preference for the large reinforcer under
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Equal Exchange Delay, when the delays to the
exchange period are equal, and preference for
the small reinforcer under Unequal Exchange
Delay, when the exchange delays favor the
small-reinforcer option.  If, on the other hand,
a general insensitivity to delay had developed,
then choice patterns should be the same
under both Equal Exchange and Unequal
Exchange delays.
Three pigeons participated in the
experiment, including the two whose
responding was insensitive to the exchange-
delay manipulations in the earlier experiment.
As before, choice of the small reinforcer
produced 1 token immediately, whereas choice
of the large reinforcer produced 3 tokens after
a 6-s delay.  Exchange periods were scheduled
each trial, either 10 s from either choice (Equal
Exchange Delay) or 0.1 s after small-reinforcer
choices and 10 s after large-reinforcers choices
(Unequal Exchange Delay).   All 3 subjects
strongly preferred the larger reinforcer when
the delays to the exchange period were equal
(Equal Exchange Delay).  When choosing the
smaller reinforcer also resulted in quicker
access to exchange periods (Unequal Exchange
Delay), preferences reversed in favor of the
small reinforcer, and then reversed back when
the exchange delays were again made equal
(Equal Exchange Delay).  The results provided
no evidence of generalized insensitivity to
delay.  Instead, they provided clear evidence
that choices were governed not by token
delays (as self-control is normally defined in
studies with humans), but by exchange delays
(which are usually held constant in
experiments with humans).
Subsequent research has provided even
more conclusive evidence in support of the
exchange-delay effect—the finding that self-
control choices are governed by exchange delays
as opposed to token delays (Hackenberg &
Vaidya, 2003).  This suggests that previously
reported differences between pigeons and
people may have more to do with how self-
control has been defined than with genuine
species differences in self-control.  When the
procedures used to study self-control in pigeons
and humans are brought into closer alignment,
pigeons’ choices come to more closely resemble
those normally seen in humans: they show less
delay sensitivity and a greater degree of “self-
control”.  Would the converse also hold?  That
is, would making the procedures used with
humans more “animal-like” (by using
consumable-type reinforcers vs. token-type
reinforcers) yield performances more like those
seen in pigeons?
MAKING HUMAN PROCEDURES MORE “ANIMAL-
LIKE”: CONSUMABLE-TYPE REINFORCERS WITH
HUMANS
A second approach to the problem of
assessing cross-species continuity in self-control
is to use reinforcers more typical of nonhuman
research with humans, or, in other words,
reinforcers of more immediate consummatory
value.  A variety of consumable-type reinforcers
have been used successfully in laboratory
research with humans (Mazur, 1998; Pilgrim,
1998), but additional work with reinforcers of
this general sort are sorely needed in the area
of self-control.
The most systematic exploration of food/
liquid reinforcers in a self-control context was
conducted by Logue and colleagues (Forzano
& Logue, 1992, 1994, 1995; Logue & King,
1991).  Logue and King (1991), for example,
gave adult humans repeated choices between
smaller and larger reinforcers (3-s vs. 6-s access
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to preferred juice) available following different
delays (1 s vs. 60 s, respectively).  Unlike
previous results with humans, in which strong
preference for the larger reinforcer was typically
seen, Logue and King reported a lower
proportion of self-control choice patterns (8 of
19 subjects preferred the larger reinforcer on
at least 2/3 of choice trials).  Only 4 of the
remaining 11 subjects, however, clearly
preferred the smaller reinforcer (the remaining
7 were roughly indifferent)—not exactly what
is to be expected if the consequences are serving
as potent reinforcers (as food does for food-
deprived nonhumans).
The main difficulties appear to be
motivational: establishing and maintaining
conditions under which the food retains its
effectiveness as a reinforcer.  To enhance the
effectiveness of the liquid reinforcers, Logue and
King asked subjects to abstain from eating or
drinking for 4 hrs prior to the session.  No
procedures were in place, however, to verify
compliance.  Moreover, even if food intake was
restricted over this period, this level of
restriction is far less than that used routinely
in studies with nonhuman subjects.
Additional research is needed along these
lines, including techniques for enhancing the
effectiveness of food reinforcers (e.g., Forzano
& Logue, 1995).  In finding reinforcers suitable
for cross-species comparisons it is first
important to demonstrate that the putative
reinforcer has effects comparable to other more
commonly used reinforcers.  Only then can
the performances engendered by different
reinforcers be compared in functional terms.
In the case of self-control choices, for example,
it would be important to demonstrate
sensitivity to reinforcer immediacy in isolation,
prior to pitting it against reinforcer magnitu-
de in a self-control arrangement (Navarick,
1988).  Unless the reinforcer produces
characteristic delay sensitivity—that is, a
decrease in reinforcer value with increases in
delay—then it is not functionally the same type
of reinforcer as used with other animals.  Only
after determining that the putative reinforcers
are in fact functional reinforcers does it make
sense to pit reinforcer delay and amount against
each other in a self-control procedure.
A promising approach to this problem
was developed by Navarick (1996) with
prerecorded TV segments as  reinforcers in a
choice context with adult humans.  Eleven of
the 15 subjects tested showed some sensitivity
to reinforcer immediacy, defined as preference
for the more immediate of two delayed video
segments of equal duration.  This suggests that
video segments for humans, like food reinforcers
with animals, are devalued by delay.
In a later study, Navarick (1998) placed
reinforcer immediacy and reinforcer amount
in opposition.  Subjects chose between a 15-s
video segment presented immediately and a
25-s video segment delayed by 55 s.  Trials
lasted 90 s, so that the rate of trial onset
remained constant irrespective of which choice
had been made.  Subjects were studied for 2
sessions (20 choice trials per session) separated
by an average of 11 days.  The overall pattern
of results can be summarized briefly:  Despite
strong stability of within-subject choice
patterns across the 2 sessions, there was
considerable between-subject variability: 6
subjects preferred the smaller more immediate
video segment, 8 subjects the longer delayed
segment, and 1 subject was roughly indifferent.
Thus, on the whole, the results are somewhat
mixed.  On one hand, delay sensitivity was seen
in approximately 40% of the subjects,
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suggesting that these reinforcers were more
comparable to consumable-type reinforcers
used with other animals than to the token-type
reinforcers typically used with humans.  On
the other hand, the between-subject
variability—due perhaps to the relatively brief
exposure to the contingencies—urges caution
in the interpretation of such findings.
Also using video reinforcers, Hackenberg
and Pietras (2000) gave adult humans repeated
choices between a smaller sooner video segment
and a longer later video segment.  Unlike
Navarick’s (1998) study, conditions were in
effect until choice patterns were stable.  Also
unlike Navarick’s study, the videos were
embedded within a token-reinforcement
procedure, which permitted a direct within-
subject comparison of the two reinforcement
systems: token vs. consumable.
Tokens consisted of stimulus lights
mounted in an array above the choice keys.
In a discrete-trial procedure, subjects chose
between a small reinforcer (1 light) available
immediately and a large reinforcer (3 lights)
after a delay (either 60 s or 120 s, depending
on the condition).  Each light could be
exchanged for 15-s access to a video during
scheduled exchange periods at the end of each
choice trial.  To hold the rate of trial onset
constant, a variable-duration ITI was
interspersed between exchange periods and
subsequent choice trials.  Sessions consisted
of 14 trials: 4 forced-choice trials (during
which only one option was available) and 10
choice trials.
Subjects were initially exposed to two
conditions designed to assess sensitivity to
reinforcer amount and reinforcer delay
separately.  In the amount-sensitivity
conditions, subjects chose between different
reinforcer amounts (long vs. short video
segments) with equal delays; in the delay-
sensitivity conditions, subjects chose between
different reinforcer delays with equal reinforcer
amounts.  In both conditions, subjects
preferred sooner to later videos of equal
duration and longer to shorter video access with
equal delays.  These results are significant in
showing that the video clips produced
characteristic delay and amount sensitivity, an
important step in functionally calibrating video
reinforcers against other reinforcer types, as
described above (Navarick, 1988, 1996).
Subjects were then exposed to choices
between video segments of differing delays
and durations.  As in prior token-based self-
control studies with pigeons (Jackson &
Hackenberg, 1996), the main independent
variable was the delay to the exchange period.
In some conditions, the exchange periods
were scheduled just after token presentation,
and were thus shorter for small-reinforcer
choices than for large-reinforcer choices.
These Unequal Exchange Delay  conditions
alternated with Equal Exchange Delay
conditions with exchange periods scheduled
at the end of each trial.
When the videos could be viewed as they
were earned (Unequal Exchange Delay), both
subjects preferred the smaller sooner video clip.
When video time earned could not be
exchanged until the end of the trial (Equal
Exchange Delay), preference reversed in favor
of the larger reinforcer.  When conditions were
changed back to Unequal Exchange Delay,
preferences reversed again in favor of the smaller
reinforcer.  In showing sensitivity to exchange-
delay manipulations, these results with humans
are in striking agreement with those obtained
with pigeons on token-based self-control
144
SPECIES DIFFERENCES IN CHOICE AND SELF-CONTROL
procedures (Hackenberg & Vaidya, 2003;
Jackson & Hackenberg, 1996).
Forzano and Logue (1994) reported
effects similar to Hackenberg and Pietras
(2000) but with juice reinforcers.  In their
experiment, adult humans were given choices
between smaller and larger reinforcers that
differed in their quality (juice vs. money) and
in their exchange delays.  When the reinforcers
consisted of juice available after each choice
(Experiment 1) subjects showed greater
sensitivity to reinforcer immediacy than when
the reinforcers consisted of points exchangeable
for money after the session (Experiment 2).
This finding is consistent with others
mentioned above showing that qualitatively
different reinforcers may engender different
degrees of self-control.
The most novel manipulation was carried
out in Experiment 3, in which subjects were
given choices between points exchangeable for
juice at the end of the session.  Because the
delays to points differed but the delays to the
period during which they were exchangeable
for juice did not, this experiment permitted a
sharper specification of the controlling
variables.  That is, if choices were governed
merely by differences in reinforcer quality (juice
vs. money), then choice patterns here should
have been more similar to those obtained in
Experiment 1 in which choices produced juice.
On the other hand, if choices were governed
by delays to exchange periods, then choice
patterns should have been more similar to those
obtained in Experiment 2 in which choices
produced points exchangeable for money.  The
results were consistent with those of
Experiment 2, suggesting that the delay to the
terminal reinforcer was more critical than the
quality of the reinforcer per se.
When delays to the exchange period
differed, permitting more immediate
consumption of the smaller reinforcer, the
smaller reinforcer was preferred; when delays
to the exchange period were equal, the larger
reinforcer was preferred.  Thus, along with
Hackenberg and Pietras (2000), the results of
Forzano and Logue (1994) suggest that the
nature of the reinforcers (consumable vs. token)
is less important than the nature of the
contingencies governing the consumption of
those reinforcers.
CONCLUSIONS
Taken together, the studies described
here lend support to the main thesis, that
procedures can be modified to bring the
results of experiments on human and
nonhuman behavior into better alignment.
By studying pigeon and human behavior
under closely analogous experimental
conditions, we are in a better position to
distinguish genuine species differences in
psychological process from mere differences
in procedure.  With respect to self-control
choices, the available evidence suggests that
at least some of the differences in the
performances of humans and other animals
reflect differences in procedure.
This is not to imply that all differences
in pigeon and human behavior studied in the
laboratory are procedural artifacts, or that
people are just like pigeons.  Important
differences certainly exist (as in the realm of
verbal behavior).  The main point is
methodological—only by studying different
species under circumstances as similar as
possible do we put ourselves in a position to
discover the nature and extent of those
differences that may exist.
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But even similarities should be viewed
with caution.  In terms of a distinction
advocated by Hodos and Campbell (1969), a
nonhuman behavior pattern may be analogous
to but not homologous to a human behavior
pattern.  For example, the parallel (convergent)
evolution of wings in birds and bats produced
anatomical patterns that were analogous but
not homologous; despite their similarity, they
were the outcome of different historical
pathways.  So too, with similarities in the choice
patterns of humans and other animals may be
the result of different behavioral histories
(Shimoff & Catania, 1988).
In determining whether similarities
are homologous (have similar origins, or
occur for similar reasons) or analogous
(different historical pathways leading to si-
milar ends), it is important to use procedures
that are as similar as possible, and to obtain
detailed measures of performance at several
values of the independent variable.  As
Sidman (1960) writes:
Our problem is not one of analogizing, but of
obtaining sufficient understanding of both rats
and men to be able to recognize resemblances in
behavioral processes.  We must be able to classify
our variables in such a manner that we can
recognize similarities in their principles of
operation, in spite of the fact that their physical
specifications may be quite different.  (p. 27)
To understand how humans differ from
other animals we must first understand how
we are similar to other animals.  And this can
be done only by, in a sense, stepping outside
of humankind, for it is by comparisons to things
that are not human does the nature and
provenance of human behavior come into focus.
This point was long ago recognized by Skinner:
Although it is sometimes said that research on
lower animals makes it impossible to discover
what is uniquely human, it is only by studying
the behavior of lower animals that we can tell
what is distinctly human.  The range of what
has seemed to be human has been
progressively reduced as lower organisms have
come to be better understood.  What survives,
of course, is of the greatest importance.
(Skinner, 1969, p. 101)
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